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Larry  
Hamermesh: This is the panel of people who have been associated with 
B Lab for various lengths of time, but who really can put 
practical vision and facts before us in a way that the 
papers we’ve heard so far, while all really interesting, 
can’t quite do. All of these papers converge on this 
subject: what actually happens and what’s happened so 
far. So what I’m going to do is try to lead us through what 
could be an oral history, if it’s appropriately recorded, of 
B Lab. And thanks in large part to Rick Alexander, who 
knows the inside story pretty well, I’ve got a series of 
questions here that in honor of the program, I’m calling 
the Berle q’s. 
 
We’ve got four categories to cover. The first one is what 
I call the birth story of B Lab, and that’s going to be 
talking mostly to Bart Houlahan and a little bit to Rick, as 
his birth story is kind of interesting, as well. 
 
Dan  
Osusky: Not mine? 
 
Larry: We’re happy to hear your educational background at 
some point because I got a glimpse of that. That’s quite 
relevant. The second piece is about standards, which 
we’ve already talked about thanks to Mike Dorff and 
some others. I want to dive a little bit deeper into that 
subject. Third—and this is going to focus on Rick, 
primarily—is some of the legal aspects of B Lab and its 
work. And then finally, a category stepping back and 
asking some questions that ask us to assess where we are 
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and where we’re going. So that’s the roadmap to this 
session. 
 
So in terms of the birth story and early days, or pre-early 
days, as I said I’m going to look mostly at Bart for this 
one. And I’m curious about who you were and who your 
cofounders were before B Lab. So take it away. 
 
Bart  
Houlahan: Even before we answer that, just a couple of quick things 
I think are really important. First to Chuck O’Kelley, 
thank you for a profound two days I think for all of us, 
and I think most acutely for the three of us up here, so 
thank you very much. And to all of you, there’s a lot of 
things we don’t do well at B Lab, quite honestly. One of 
the things we aspire to do is actually take constructive 
criticism. And I think that’s reflected in how the 
legislation has been working as it’s moved across the 
states. And I think it’s reflected in how our standards have 
changed dramatically over the course of the last eight 
years. 
 
And so please know that we’re deeply appreciative for 
both—I can’t remember the two names—but the one was 
a concerned supporter and the other an enthusiastic 
skeptic; honestly all of you. So genuinely, we’re deeply 
appreciative of the work that you put in to try to advance 
what we all hope to be our life’s work. So thank you. 
 
Now Larry, people make fun of attorneys. The truth is that 
I occupy a profession that perhaps is more hated: I’m a 
reformed investment banker. I attended Stanford 
University. I graduated from Stanford, and then I went to 
Wall Street. I spent a couple of years on Wall Street. I 
loved the work, but I hated the people. I moved to Boston 
to continue my work in investment banking, where I ran 
into a college roommate, Jay Coen Gilbert—he’s one of 
our cofounders at B Lab—at a wedding. At the time, Jay 
had started an athletic footwear company. 
 
It was about six months old, and it was called AND1. He 
was lamenting that he couldn’t find a president to run the 
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company. I couldn’t believe he hadn’t called me, and if I 
remember correctly, I think I called him a variety of four-
letter words at the wedding. I was about six months from 
starting Harvard Business School, but at the end of the 
wedding, I called Harvard and told them to keep their 
deposit and that I was going to join, at the time, a half-
million-dollar tee shirt company. For those of you who 
don’t know, AND1 was a company that sold basketball 
footwear and apparel. We scaled the company up to about 
$250 or $300 million in revenue over the course of 11 
years and sold it in 2005. 
 
And so my identity is as an entrepreneur more than a 
banker. I consider myself as someone who believes in the 
power of business and as someone firsthand who believes 
it can be a force for good. 
 
Larry: So here’s the question. You’re engaged in this 
entrepreneurial activity. At some point, the light bulb goes 
off and we think “B Lab.” Maybe not in so many words, 
but what happened? 
 
Bart: In general, there wasn’t a eureka moment. This was a 
process rather than an event for all of us. And so my 
personal story and how I wound up at B Lab is that AND1 
started as a company that was deeply committed to social 
responsibility. Not because our consumers cared; they 
didn’t. We were selling basketball shoes to 18-year-old 
kids. It was just the type of company we wanted to be 
proud of. And over the course of the 11 years, over and 
over again, our commitment to social responsibility 
proved to be not only the right thing to do but also good 
business. We saw that show up in employee retention, 
relationships with our suppliers, relationships with our 
retailers, and lots of wonderful stories behind all of that. 
 
But what I also learned in those 11 years is that it’s really 
easy to be socially responsible when there are seven of 
you, but being socially responsible gets a little bit harder 
as you scale. It really does. We did a leveraged recap in 
1999 where we brought in TA Associates. For those of 
you who don’t know it, TA is a big private equity player. 
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I’m a huge fan of TA; they’re a great investor. But when 
you’re not playing with your own money, it gets acutely 
difficult, frankly, to continue your commitment to your 
employees, the community, and the environment and it 
shows up in the boardroom frequently. 
 
And then finally, two things happened in our 11-year run. 
First, Nike, Adidas, and Reebok came hard after us. They 
were asleep at the switch, and eventually they woke up to 
our scale. And Nike had their national sales meeting, they 
circulated a key chain; the key chain had a target, and at 
the center of it was AND1. We dropped $100 million in 
18 months. And I can tell you it is acutely difficult to be 
cognizant of your employees, the community, and the 
environment when your business is going sideways. 
 
Second, at the moment of liquidity, when it was time to 
sell the company, our management team was exhausted. 
We had turned the company back around; we got it back 
on a good growth path. And importantly, this is not a Ben 
& Jerry’s story. This is not a story of lament. We sold the 
company to somebody who paid us absolutely fair value, 
and we knew what we were doing when we went into the 
sale process. But at the moment of liquidity, we couldn’t 
even talk at the moment of liquidity about our 
stakeholders. We had three offers on the table and the 
decision was about which one was the highest value. 
 
Within three months of the sale, whatever was left of our 
commitment to employees, community, and environment 
was completely wiped out by the new board. So for me 
personally, it felt like there had to be a way that a 
company could begin with a mission or a purpose, raise 
outside capital, scale the organization, have a liquidity 
event, and still know the purpose was maintained. And 
firsthand, I can tell you that that was not available to us at 
AND1. 
 
Larry: Okay. So that morphs into the next question. How can you 
create a structure that will permit you to do what you’re 
doing? 
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Bart: It starts very narrow. There’s got to be a way a company 
can have mission at its center and know that it can find 
mission-aligned investors and a succession plan that’s 
going to preserve to the mission long term. That was the 
center of the bull’s eye on day one for B Lab. 
 
Larry: That sounds like it answers the next question I have for 
you, which builds on something Rick was saying in the 
previous session. There is a lot of activity out there where 
impact investing and sustainability are not new concepts. 
But as I understand it, B Lab is pretty much the pioneer 
on the frontier of something that goes beyond that and 
embraces some kind of governance requirement. So how 
did you get there? 
 
Bart: There’s a pragmatic answer and a theoretical answer, so 
let’s deal with both. On day one, again, we had a pretty 
narrow focus. We didn’t launch the certification for a 
year. From the moment of inception, it was a full year of 
investigation where the mission of the organization 
continued to morph. And the mission, relatively quickly, 
Larry, went from our hope to help a social enterprise 
maintain purpose long term, to a much broader question 
which is what is the role of business in society? What do 
we expect out of corporations more broadly? 
 
Regarding the pragmatic answer for the social enterprise, 
we needed to create alignment and clarity from the board, 
investors, and management around what the purpose of 
the company was. There needed to be a way that purpose 
was going to last over time. So that manifested into the 
certification. The certification has higher standards in 
social and environmental performance that are built to last 
through a legal change. So that was the very pragmatic 
solution: how can somebody hold onto mission long 
term? 
 
The more theoretical, though, was that fundamentally our 
collective vision, recognizing there’s thousands of 
organizations working on this and that we’re just one, is 
to redefine success in business. As we all talk about what 
a successful business is a generation from now, it 
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shouldn’t exclusively be focused on earnings per share, 
revenue growth rate, quick ratios, and debt to equity 
ratios; it must also include employee engagement, 
community involvement, and environmental footprint. 
And what we realized relatively early in the first year was 
that the current system was not structured to do that. The 
system currently is not structured to try to create 
organizations that can scale both profits and purpose. 
 
And there were two pretty clear elements of systemic 
infrastructure, at least to us, that seemed to be missing. 
First, was a set of standards that helped you define what a 
good business was; that codified it and differentiated 
between a good company and just good marketing. And 
importantly, there are hundreds of standards out there, but 
they are all very product or practice focused. They are not 
at the corporate level. And the modest innovation that we 
tried to introduce was elevating the conversation from one 
around product or practice to the whole corporation. So 
that’s where our standards came from; the idea of a set of 
standards that looked at the whole corporation. 
 
And then second, if what we really want in a generation’s 
time are different outcomes from our businesses, then we 
have to change the rules. There was a core belief that the 
maxim of shareholder primacy was—again, in our 
opinion—leading to an externalization of costs that were 
unsustainable for society and the environment. And that 
if you really want to be in a position where you’re 
harnessing the power of 80 percent of US GDP towards 
solving our problems instead of creating them, there has 
to be a change of rules. And so pragmatically, if you want 
to scale the positive impact of business, I believe there 
needs to be a different set of rules. 
 
Larry: That’s actually a perfect point to interrupt and turn to Rick 
for a minute. Because when you talk about a changed 
perspective, change that would require in this case legal 
structure for talking about corporate purpose, you get to 
Rick and you get to 2013 or 2012 or whenever it was that 
B Lab first approached us in Delaware. And Rick and I, 
in case you don’t know, have a certain amount in 
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common. We live a block apart from each other. We’re 
on the same flight tomorrow. But more importantly, we 
come from the same law firm. I’ve been away a lot longer 
than Rick has, but we also come from the same 
perspective of what corporate law has meant. 
 
And so what I’d like to hear from you, Rick, is your 
evolution—which I have not completely understood, but 
I’m getting there—from being the quintessential 
Delaware transactional advisor to where you are now. 
 
Rick  
Alexander: Sure. And I talk about this a little bit in the paper and in 
the book, and everywhere I can because I like to talk about 
myself. But Larry describes it exactly right. Larry and I 
serve on a committee of the Delaware Bar Association 
that looks every year at changes to the statute to keep it 
updated. And I think in 2011—entering the process after 
Bill Clark wrote, pro bono, the entire model benefit 
corporation statute and then, with B Lab, went through a 
process of taking it from legislature to legislature—of 
course B Lab wanted to get Delaware. Delaware is like a 
headline for corporation law. 
 
So they came to our group, and I think our initial reaction 
was that just sounds like this other constituency statute 
thing that we rejected many years ago because we know 
how corporate law works. Whatever your political stripes 
might be, a corporation produces profits and is backed by 
people who put money in it, and you can figure that’s a 
great way to allocate capital. If you think there are too 
many externalities, then you go to Congress and lobby for 
some legislation to make corporations internalize those 
external costs. 
 
And that’s a great system; look how much wealth the 
corporation—the general corporate law—has produced 
across the globe in the last 100 to 150 years. So that was 
our reaction, but B Lab is a persistent organization if 
nothing else. And somehow, some other people in the 
state that sat in the state house and the governor’s mansion 
and places like that called us and said, “Why don’t you 
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guys look a little bit harder at this question?” And so we 
formed a group to look a little bit harder. 
 
I will say that Delaware prides itself on having an 
enabling statute and not stopping people from doing what 
they want to do. So even without necessarily believing 
that the benefit corporation is the best model, there’s a 
strong logic from the Delaware perspective saying, “Gee, 
if there are entrepreneurs and investors who want to use a 
form that has something other than stockholder primacy, 
we ought not prevent them from doing that unless there’s 
some very strong, paternalistic reason for doing so.” And 
as we thought about it, we didn’t think there was, at least 
if we built in more protections than you might have in the 
other constituencies provisions. 
 
And so we went to work on that basis. I’ll just say this 
isn’t important information, but it’s fun information to 
know that we had negotiations over the actual text of the 
statute. So if you’re familiar with that . . . . 
 
Larry:   This is the stage called grudging approval. 
 
Rick: You’ve had that in Tennessee, as well. And people know 
that our form in Delaware differs. We were really thinking 
about public companies because that’s our constituency 
in a way that is not the constituency of other states. But 
there’s back and forth when you negotiate, and I’ll just 
say that there finally came a day when it was time to 
finish—the secretary of state of Delaware thought it was 
time to finish up. So a member of the Council and myself, 
Bart, and Andrew—another cofounder—were put in a 
room. And the Secretary of State stood in the room and 
said you’re not leaving until you’ve got a statute. And so 
that’s how we got our statute in Delaware. 
 
Larry: But that was I said, the stage of grudging approval. 
 
Rick:  Right. 
 
Larry:  But you’ve evolved since then. 
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Rick: I’d say by the time we got there, I had a view about how 
the statute should read. But I really did become convinced 
that not only was it a good model but also there were a lot 
of assumptions built into the idea that stakeholder 
primacy was the best way to allocate capital and the 
assumption—and we’ve been talking about this for the 
last few days—that everybody else, every other 
stakeholder has a shot at negotiating. And so it’s only the 
equity holder who is the residual risk bearer. That just 
doesn’t really describe reality in any way. 
 
The people who are going to live on the earth in 20 years 
with whatever temperature it is, they’re not bargaining 
with the corporation. So it’s really not hard, once you see 
it, you go from denying to fighting to saying that’s 
obvious. I think once you think about the externalization 
of cost and the ability of corporations to do that, it 
becomes hard to believe in stockholder primacy unless 
you think the government can really regulate down to the 
last detail—and that’s just never going to happen. 
 
Larry: So let me go back to the rest of the birth story. You’ve got 
this realization gradually dawning on you that something 
needs to be done about the legal framework. So what did 
you do next to get B Lab off the ground and how did it 
happen? 
 
Bart: You all know better than I do in this room that for 35 
years, people have been talking about the idea of a new 
corporate form. This isn’t a revolution; it’s been out there 
for a while. All we did, Larry, is inverted the process. 
What I mean by that, what we realized pretty early on, 
was that legislators needed a constituency to act. For a 
long time, people had talked about trying to create some 
sort of corporate form, but they didn’t have anybody to 
point to and say, “These are the folks that you’re creating 
it for.” 
 
And so we began by creating a community. If you move 
all the way back, we always had on the roadmap the idea 
of the creation of a legislative initiative, but we needed a 
community to advocate for it. And the way to build that 
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community for us was the creation of the certification. So 
we found leaders. 
 
There’s lots of different ways people are attacking this 
problem. There is a huge swath of folks who are doing 
wonderful work focused on the largest corporations in the 
world and trying to move them by degree towards a more 
sustainable future—really noble and terrific work. 
 
Our model, however, is to propose an alternative and 
encourage people to follow that alternative. And so what 
we needed to do was to find, for us, leaders. When you 
looked at the community of Certified B Corporations, you 
could identify companies that you admired. So if we go 
all the way back to the very beginning, Larry, we laid out 
a map for us of the stakeholders in the space in fair trade, 
in green building, essentially anybody who was leading in 
the space who believed their business had a role to play. 
And our objective was to find those leaders, to bring them 
into the community of Certified B Corporations, and then 
use them as our advocacy group to try to create the new 
legal form. 
 
That same community of leaders also serves as an 
inspirational group of people for others. We’ll talk a little 
bit later about. At the end of the day, it is about leadership 
not the certification. We never envisioned the world to be 
made up of Certified B Corporations; that’s not the intent. 
The certification is a best in class, gold star certification 
that we hope will inspire others to follow. And so, Larry, 
going all the way back, our first stop on the roadmap was 
finding leaders. Finding folks who people would admire 
and who are going to be willing to carry this flag and lead 
in this community of CSR, or call it what you want, for 
decades. 
 
That was our target—to find leaders, to bring them 
onboard, and then to use them as our vehicle for advocacy 
in demonstrating that you could do both. You can make 
money and make a difference. And in fact, you can do it 
in a way that actually creates a more resilient business. 
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Larry: So you got this cadre—that’s not even the best word—of 
people convinced of the mission. I take it that some days 
were better than others—good times, bad times. How did 
it play out? 
 
Bart: Let’s talk good times and then we’ll share some stories, 
even though we’re on film, about the bad times. I don’t 
know if you guys are aware. I think on 24 occasions this 
legislation has passed unanimously. To have legislation in 
today’s partisan world that’s embraced by Governor 
Jindal and Governor Cuomo, that’s a good day. That’s a 
good day. Our community takes great pride in not making 
this a political movement. Our movement is made up of 
the far right, the far left, and everyone in between. And 
the idea of using business as a force for good is one that 
everyone can get behind. That’s one example of a bunch 
of good days that we have had as we started to pass the 
legislation. 
 
You know, there was a bad day, one of our worst days—
I probably shouldn’t be sharing this, but here we are. 
There was a moment while we were in the wonderful 
negotiations with Delaware where the legislation was 
headed towards something that was going to be very 
narrowly focused. It was going to be where you could be 
a public benefit corporation if you continued to maximize 
shareholder value and you added . . . something. 
 
And maybe that’s half a loaf? Though half a loaf is a good 
thing, alone in Delaware we viewed it as potentially 
devastating—that it would create green washing of the 
worst kind. That we’d have companies that we all 
couldn’t imagine being benefit corporations saying, “I’m 
a benefit corporation because behind Plant 36 is a 
playground and I put five grand a year into that damn 
playground, and it is a beautiful playground.” Although I 
recognize the value of adding some constituency, alone I 
think it is a huge risk. 
 
And there was a period of time, where we thought we 
were going to lose the negotiation, and the legislation was 
going to end up being very specifically focused. Our 
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argument was if Delaware chose that path, then at least 
change the name. Don’t call it a benefit corporation. At a 
minimum, please don’t call it a benefit corporation. 
Benefit corporations had recognition and some brand 
equity at that point. But no, of course they wanted to call 
it a benefit corporation. So we, as a community, started to 
think about how we were going to deal with this. 
 
Our possible response included a range of options that we 
tried to get our community onboard with. If this goes this 
way, this is what we’re going to do. If this goes that way, 
this is what we’re going to do. One option was using 
publicity to try to encourage the State of Delaware to not 
make it the home of green washing. Within about an hour 
of our communication with the community, all those 
plans had been forwarded to the governor and Chancellor 
Strine. And oh my goodness, that was a bad moment. That 
was a very bad moment because we had people who had 
been working with us in good faith to try to find an 
answer, and they felt we were planning a response that 
was going to be potentially very damaging to the State. 
 
So that is a moment from the trenches. Honestly, I would 
tell you with genuine sincerity that if this endeavor had 
gone the wrong way, we wouldn’t all be sitting here. 
Benefit corporation would mean something totally 
different. And I don’t think we’d have remotely the 
traction that we currently have because it wouldn’t have 
passed in Delaware. It would have been a mess. So that is 
one of the not so good days. 
 
Larry: The good news is that good things followed. That it all 
worked out. 
 
Rick:  It did all work out. 
 
Larry: The mode of persuasion was ultimately done right. I 
remember hearing from investors, which was something 
new, terms that we hadn’t heard before. That was a very 
thoughtful strategy because that’s sort of a major 
Delaware constituency. Anyway, Dan, our standards 
development manager, just by way of transitioning to the 
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subject of standards, where do you come from? How did 
you get here? 
 
Dan: I’ll keep this short because I guess my career is 
significantly shorter than the other people I’m up here 
with. Twenty-nine, right? 
 
Audience  
Member: I would say that. 
 
Dan: My background is actually in philosophy. I used to be an 
ethics teacher, with an undergraduate degree both in 
philosophy and economics because I had a particular 
interest in issues of international development, global 
poverty, and global justice. And, following graduate 
school, I had the great fortune of getting an entry level job 
with B Lab about three years ago. I transitioned myself 
from a member of the team that actually takes companies 
through the certification process to working with Bart on 
the development process and now I oversee that. 
 
Larry: So Dan, do you want to answer this, or Bart, or both of 
you? Just real quickly, we’ve talked a lot about the 
standards, but maybe we ought to drop back and just take 
a bird’s eye view of what they are and how they work. 
 
Dan: I think I’ve transferred all of my knowledge to Mike 
Dorff, an audience member. I think stepping back, it’s 
actually worth mentioning the many different ways that 
our standards are used because I think we’ve been having 
this conversation in different places. First and foremost, 
from the benefit corporation perspective, it can be used 
for reporting purposes. Then obviously, we use the BIA 
for B Corp certification. On top of that, we’ve had an 
investor-focused tool that’s called GIIRS; that’s the 
Global Impact Investing Rating System. And even 
beyond that, we’ve expanded into work with a variety of 
other groups around measure what matters campaigns, 
where the focus is in getting companies through this 
process, whether it’s for companies in your supply chain 
or companies in your jurisdiction if you’re a municipality, 
etc. These groups have an eye towards both assessment, 
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as well as improvement. So the standards that we’ve 
developed, frankly, have a lot of different use cases. And 
they’re all probably coming from a slightly different 
perspective. So we need to balance the variety of ways 
that our companies are using the assessment when we 
think about the principles. 
 
The overarching principles that we’ve baked into the 
assessment are relatively straightforward. We’ve 
discussed at length this concept of it being a positive 
impact assessment. On top of that, I think one of the other 
key focuses is around this green washing concept—it’s 
important for it to be a comprehensive assessment. In the 
sense that the assessment needs to cover all stakeholders 
that are affected by a business, as well as essentially all 
the levels of the business as a corporate entity. 
 
In addition to those two principles, the tool needs to be 
both objective and independent. It needs to be dynamic, 
as well as governed by an outside group so we can all 
recognize imperfections that it currently has and make 
sure there’s a mechanism for it to improve. It’s also—
particularly for the value of those measure what matters 
campaigns—both educational and aspirational. And so 
what that means is there’s a real value in creating 
indicators in the assessment that show you how to get 
somewhere and don’t just tell you whether or not you are 
there. 
 
We want this to be as actionable as possible so we’re 
actually creating a roadmap for companies to improve 
themselves. In addition to that, I know as part of Mike’s 
talk, he’s discussed some of the balances that need to be 
struck. The assessment is intended to be standardized and 
comparable across companies and be particularly 
comparable within industry, size, etc. At the same time, 
because of that, we also need to recognize that it’s 
customized. So it’s this balance between full 
standardization and customization to make sure it’s 
relevant to the actual users of the tool. 
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Larry: So I think you’ve partly answered this, but if it seems 
clear that you’re not the philosopher king who sits in the 
room dreaming up ideal standards . . . . 
 
Dan: As much as I would like to be, that sounds kind of fun. 
 
Larry: But it’s much more than that, obviously. And so maybe 
with an example of one standard, describe where it came 
from. 
 
Dan: Yes. So let me give a little bit of a general introduction 
and then we can talk about an example. So we have talked 
about this independent governance. We have a Standards 
Advisory Council that’s actually split into two different 
bodies: one for emerging markets and one for developed 
markets. This is a multi-stakeholder group; it’s about ten 
individuals on both sides. And so I’m in the unenviable 
position to not only have to report to Bart but also to 
report to 20 experts in the space as we’re presenting this 
information. 
 
They ultimately oversee all the decisions of the content 
that goes into our assessment. On the other side, there 
needs to be input mechanisms from our users and from 
other stakeholders. And so within our assessment tool 
there’s actually opportunities for anyone in that 
assessment to leave feedback on any given question in our 
assessment. We get around 3,000 pieces of feedback 
through that tool each year, and that’s expanding. So 
we’re reviewing the feedback and basically accumulating 
those for presentations through that Standards Advisory 
Council. 
 
We also engage with external stakeholders, particularly 
other standards organizations because they’re going to 
have a variety of expertise, as well as other stakeholder 
engagement mechanisms that we’re ultimately able to 
utilize. That we can work with them and partner so it’s not 
just our engagement with users, but it’s their engagement 
that can really inform the assessment’s content. 
 
336 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:321 
So to give you an example, I think there’s two I can talk 
about. I’ll start with one because I think it also highlights 
where we see this continuous improvement ideal. There’s 
been some conversations around for-profit higher 
education and their impact, as well as any new potential 
concerns around that. Our assessment tool, in some 
circumstances, particularly around the product impact of 
a company, can at times be relatively blunt. And so for 
something like an educational institution which 
previously had, in our assessment, been recognized 
simply as an educational institution, we’d allocate some 
credit for that simply because there’s value in education. 
 
Additionally, there’s ultimately extra credit if you are 
serving underserved groups with that beneficial product. 
When you look at that, and when you look at an industry 
like for-profit education, there’s a pretty big concern. 
They are almost exclusively serving these 
underrepresented groups, and there’s real questions 
around the actual quality of the service that’s being 
provided. And so that blunt tool just didn’t really work. 
 
In order to address that within our assessment, first we 
actually placed a moratorium on certifying any for-profit 
higher education institute because there was a real 
concern about using our existing standard. And we 
actually embarked on what was almost a two-year 
process—18 months—where we convened an expert 
working group of folks who have expertise in the higher 
education industry to develop an addendum to our 
assessment. That addendum, working with that working 
group, consisted of about a year of research looking at 
other standards, looking at the data, and working with 
their expertise to develop drafts. And then taking that 
addendum out to the marketplace before it became 
official, where we have both an alpha and beta testing 
process to get feedback from some of the institutions 
themselves. There was also a public comment period, 
where even before incorporating it into the standard, all 
interested stakeholders are able to review it and provide 
their feedback for us to provide another iteration before it 
gets published. And we launched the higher education 
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addendum in October of 2015 after about a year and a half 
of work. 
 
Larry: What you said is going to resonate with every law 
professor who has ever served on a self-study committee. 
But your description of the process of developing 
standards sort of leads inexorably into the ultimate 
question. To the person who’s not initiated into the work 
of B Lab in certification—who sees the statutes and hears 
talk about a material plan to benefit the society and thinks 
what the hell’s that—how would you explain to someone 
who’s new to the process, who’s relatively new, why you 
had any comfort that you’re able to distinguish between 
what are good companies and bad companies? 
 
Bart: That’s a great question, and I’ll begin with the caveat that 
impact measurement is incredibly challenging. It’s a 
brand new field and we don’t have it right. One of the 
things I wanted to add to what Dan said is that the whole 
point of our assessment is it iterates every two years. A 
whole new version comes out every two years with 
significant improvements, Larry. If you look at where we 
were eight years ago and where we are now with V5 
having launched in January of 2016, it’s a radically 
improved assessment. 
 
Our assessment still has a long way to go, with granularity 
around its specificity per industry; we’ve added now a 
half dozen industry addenda and we’ll continue to do that. 
Obviously, the emerging market piece was a brand new 
addition that we added what, four years ago now? Yeah, 
four years ago now. And so I’ll begin by saying it’s really 
hard. That being said, as I mentioned the other day, there 
is a body of work that we’re building on. This is not the 
Dan and Bart Show talking about what we need to assess. 
There has been a long history of work around what it 
means to be a sustainable business contributing to society. 
 
And we’re building on that work, whether it be the 
Natural Capital Institute, or GRI, or work that’s been done 
by the Social Venture Network. There are plenty of books 
and materials out there that we rely upon to actually, 
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Larry, cull what we think are the most relevant practices. 
One of the things that we’ve added that’s a pretty, I think, 
significant addition to this body of work is the idea that 
there are two elements that we need to look at in a 
business. One is how they operate, and the other is what 
their business model is because you can be a beautifully 
sustainable business with a business model that has 
nothing to do with creating impact. 
 
That is worthy of recognition and you can earn points in 
our assessment for that. And that is most of our overlap 
with GRI. If you think of GRI, it’s really about a deep 
dive in ESG metrics. But we’ve added on top of that the 
essential lens of those organizations that truly are social 
enterprises—that walk through the door with the business 
model where as they scale, they’re scaling not only profits 
and revenues but also impact. That could be in the product 
that they create. That could be in the people they employ. 
That could be in the ownership structure they employ. 
That could be in the value chain they use. We’ve created 
something we call impact business models that look at 16 
different impact business models. That concept is additive 
to a lot of that work I was talking about before. 
 
So at the core, the idea is to harmonize as much as 
possible across a wonderful body of work that evaluates 
not only the positive impact that’s been created but as we 
discussed—I can’t remember the two days, now—also 
making sure we disclose the negative impacts. And those 
negative impacts we also didn’t create out of whole cloth; 
they came from the IFC exclusion list plus a few others. 
And so you put it all together and you try to use it as an 
indicator. You create—largely, what I get most people 
comfortable with—a process and an end result. 
 
What I would leave you all with is that as you evaluate 
any standard, including ours, I would focus as much on 
process as the current end result because I believe a good 
standard is one that’s independently governed, that’s 
dynamic in its process, and that’s transparent in 
everything that it creates—that there is no black box and 
it creates continuous improvement where over time it will 
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continue to improve. So I don’t pretend we have it right 
today. I’m biased, but I do believe it’s, if not best in class, 
among the best in class in evaluating the whole, and 
simultaneously we’ve got a long way to go. 
 
Dan: One thing I’d add to that is there are also others who have 
visions out there outside of the business standards world 
that’s also incredibly influential and useful in this process. 
For example, the Sustainable Development Goals from 
the UN recently have been getting a lot of exposure and 
there’s been a pretty broad conversation around 
businesses’ role in achieving those. So we’ve been 
spending quite a bit of time thinking about things like that 
in terms of this overarching vision and how businesses 
should be achieving those or contributing to those, and 
how we incorporate that into our assessment. 
 
Larry: So what you both said leads to the next question, but the 
nerd that I am, when I hear gaining points is what you 
need to get to be certified, the inevitable question is, how 
do you get points? Why those points? Why not those 
points? 
 
Bart: Great question. A couple of things, going both directions 
here: first, a lot of people ask why 80 and where did the 
80 come from— Michael Dorff already talked a little bit 
about this. This is a corporate certification. What that 
means is that if you’re perfectly green, but you treat your 
employees like crap and you’re not engaged in your 
community, then you’re not going to pass. Or if you’re an 
ESOP with beautiful working conditions, but you’re 
dumping your effluents out the back door, then you’re not 
going to pass. 
 
At the end of the day, that would be a product certification 
or a practice certification. If you’re trying to certify the 
whole corporation, you need to assess the whole 
corporation—that is a firm opinion of B Lab’s and is not 
shared by everybody. Our firm opinion is that 
comprehensive matters. So, if you look at the allocation 
of points, the balance on the 80 is really about trying to 
create a balance where you have to show typically 
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excellence in at least one area and proficiency in three 
others to get over the hump. That’s very intentional. 
That’s first, full stop, where the 80 came from and how 
that fits together. 
 
Then secondly, the other thing that Michael has 
appropriately noted is that we’ve normalized the point 
scale. It’s 200 points. It doesn’t matter whether you’re a 
law firm or Dow Chemical. You have 200 points to work 
with. It is the judgment of the independent Standards 
Advisory Council to focus on materiality. Once you start 
with 200 points, the question is how do you allocate those 
200 points in that Rubik’s cube of 72 different versions 
towards the elements that are mostly material? 
 
Simplistically, to make this really tangible, we don’t 
weight environmental practices the same for Dow 
Chemical and for Drinker, Biddle & Reath. They’re 
weighted differently. Dow Chemical’s potential impact in 
the environment is far greater than Drinker, Biddle & 
Reath’s. So as a result, it begins at the highest level with 
an allocation of points based upon where the opportunity 
for impact is most material based upon the three variables 
we discussed: size, location, and industry. 
 
The next layer is, as Dan said, we’re trying to create an 
educational platform. Frankly, it would be much easier if 
the objective was to exclusively measure the impact of 
these companies. You’d have probably 20 metrics to 
follow if you just focused on outcomes and impact, and 
you’d ignore policies and practices, as well as inputs and 
outputs. You’d just focus on outcomes. We intentionally 
decided that this was a public good, so it’s free for 
anybody to use. That includes our case studies and best 
practice guidelines that are all layered throughout that are 
totally free for anybody to use. We’re going to give you 
the roadmap. We’re going to tell you what policies you’d 
start with, what is the practice that comes out of the 
policy, what are the inputs that should go into the practice, 
what are the outputs from that practice, and what are the 
outcomes we’re seeking. 
 
2017] A Conversation with B Lab 341 
All that being said, if we’re talking about materiality, the 
weighting needs to be on the outputs and outcomes. And 
so a little over 70 percent of the overall weighting of the 
200 points is really on the outputs and outcomes. We 
weight the policy piece really, really lightly because, 
frankly, it doesn’t indicate that you’ve actually done 
anything—just that you wrote it down. That’s a good 
place to start. 
 
So you can imagine that, in your framework with outputs 
and outcomes, that’s what you’re going to weight most 
materially. First, you’re going to try to determine, based 
upon where you are in that Rubik’s cube, your point 
allocation across the impact areas. Then, the next layer 
down, you’re going to try to determine your point 
allocation across the sub goals of the impact areas. And 
then, the next layer down, you’re going to try to determine 
your point allocation across the questions in the sub goals. 
So it just layers all the way through. And that’s why you 
end up with Michael’s wonderful observation that 
employee ownership is more heavily weighted for a 
service company than for a manufacturer. 
 
And the reason being is that the environmental section for 
a manufacturer is more heavily weighted and therefore 
employee ownership is weighted less. I absolutely 
recognize that there’s all sorts of wonderful debate around 
that. This is the best we’ve got so far and it needs to be 
improved, but we’re not going to let perfect be the enemy 
of the good. 
 
Larry: So speaking of reactions, I take it that you’ve had—I 
won’t say unhappy customers—but rather pushback on 
the allocations that you’ve made or ways you’ve designed 
the system. 
 
Bart:  Oh, sure. 
 
Larry: So what are some examples of where you’ve—I don’t 
want to say gotten burned either—but rather had to 
readjust in the face of criticism? 
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Bart: Yeah. If you’re trying to create an impact assessment 
that’s evaluating all companies everywhere in the world, 
by definition, certain things that you have in the impact 
assessment aren’t going to apply to everyone. As a result, 
people have really strong opinions about elements that 
they don’t feel apply to their business. It is why we have 
80 points as our threshold. It is also why there’s never 
been somebody who’s scored 200 points nor do I ever 
anticipate anybody scoring 200 points because there are 
pieces that don’t resonate with your model. 
 
Dan and I were talking about it earlier today that an easy 
example is that we have a whole section on local 
businesses. There is a body of really wonderful scholarly 
work about how local businesses help rebuild local 
communities, create better places to work, minimize 
environmental footprint, and rebuild the fabric of our 
communities. That section is inapplicable to a 
multinational, largely, and the fact that they are not going 
to be awarded points in the local section irritates them. 
 
Another example—are you all familiar with Method 
Home Products? Method is one of our founding B Corps. 
They are a great group of folks that scaled beautifully and 
sold to Ecover. They’ve now converted Ecover into a 
Certified B Corporation. Great, wonderful story. When 
Method got to the charitable giving section of our 
assessment, they lost their mind. They said, “How could 
you expect us to take capital out of the business and give 
it to a charity when we don’t know anything that is more 
impactful than what we’re doing by bringing green to the 
mainstream? Why would you give points to charitable 
giving? If we gave that money away, we believe we’d be 
reducing the impact of our organization.” That’s another 
great point. It doesn’t mean that charitable giving isn’t a 
very legitimate way to create impact for other companies. 
It just happens to not be the way that Method’s creating 
impact. 
 
Dan: Okay. And that’s why the certification is aspirational. It’s 
not compliance oriented in the sense that you need to 
check everything off. We set it up so it’s a brush. You’re 
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doing the good things and we are able to track that. If 
you’re doing enough, then you receive the certification. 
 
Larry: Right. You’re not disqualified just because you don’t 
make charitable contributions. 
 
So, suppose someone from the local cannabis industry 
approaches you and says, “We’d like to be certified as a 
B Corp.” The broader question is: Are there businesses 
you won’t certify? Not that I have a problem with the 
cannabis industry. 
 
Dan: That’s an interesting example. I guess we can talk about 
that in a little bit more detail. So, at the highest level, 
illegal industries would be a place where we draw the line. 
Beyond that, and Bart alluded to this earlier, we’ve been 
pretty cautious in the fact that we wanted to frame our 
certification and our standard around a different model, 
which is this positive impact model. Whereas a lot of the 
previous conversations have been about defining these 
types of organizations around what they are not. 
 
And so frankly, we are theoretically very hesitant to say 
there are prohibitive industries that we will not certify. 
Pragmatically, however, the Standards Advisory Council 
has the right to choose not to certify a company. 
Generally, we will review those companies in a particular 
context versus just the review of the industry. At some 
point in the future, we imagine the Standards Advisory 
Council is determining there is something about the 
particular industry that—beyond any of the particular 
practices of the company—we should, at the very least, 
wait perhaps for an addendum or something along those 
lines, or wait to see how that industry perhaps cleans up 
and changes. I’ll pause there. Anything else to add? 
 
Bart: Dan’s exactly right. We began with the belief that creating 
a list of prohibitives is a rabbit’s hole that you never get 
out of. So we begin with no prohibitives and then we deal 
with issues as they show up. 
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And the way we’ve written the term sheet and 
certification is you have to both achieve an 80 and adopt 
our legal standard. But even if you do those two things, 
we still reserve the right to deny certification based upon 
an organization that doesn’t meet the spirit of our 
Declaration of Interdependence. We talked about that a 
little bit earlier with Michael. At the core, there needs to 
be an opportunity for the Standards Advisory Council to 
take a look at those industries that are highly controversial 
and determine whether they belong in the community. 
 
Dan: There are two other mechanisms that we have that are 
really meaningful. When the Standards Advisory Council 
reviews a company, they could determine that the 
company is required to provide incremental disclosure; 
just transparency. It enables the stakeholders, the public, 
to make their own judgment where perhaps we were not 
ready to say no. In addition to that, the Standards 
Advisory Council could also advise remediation. That 
could be involved in an industry, but also in any other 
potential negative practices. 
 
The Standards Advisory Council could say the company 
can be a Certified B Corporation, but they must stop doing 
this. This has happened before, and it’s been done with 
success. And when we think about what our mission as an 
organization is, which is to drive improvement, both that 
transparency piece as well as that remediation piece is a 
lot more moving of the mountain than probably just 
banning a bunch of companies. 
 
Larry: And speaking of moving mountains, you were telling me 
a coal company would not get turned away automatically. 
 
Dan:  That’s right. 
 
Larry: So going the other direction, you’ve got to process at least 
the certification of companies. And we heard yesterday 
that there’s a process—not called audits, necessarily, but 
rather periodic reviews. And you find out something in 
that periodic review that maybe is inconsistent with 
representations at the outset or reflects a deterioration in 
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practices. Then you have to consider whether you’re 
going to continue with the certification or decertify. 
 
Decertification is available as a remedy, I guess. How do 
you apply it? How does it work? Generally, what is the 
thought process? Are there governing principles? 
 
Dan: So I actually want to add, in addition to that ongoing 
certification/recertification process where sometimes this 
gets flagged, we do conduct background checks on 
companies to actually determine beyond whether they 
voluntarily indicated something in our disclosure 
questionnaire—whether there are issues of concern. We 
also have a public complaint mechanism, which means 
that at any time if an interested stakeholder has a concern 
about any Certified B Corporation, they can reach out to 
us. We receive many complaints of varying credibility, I 
would say. 
 
Larry:  Some by competitors? 
 
Dan: You know, “My shoes fell apart, therefore they shouldn’t 
be a Certified B Corporation.” We’ll look for a few things. 
The two general principles that we use to determine 
whether or not decertification would perhaps be necessary 
is first and foremost, has the company potentially 
misrepresented themselves to us? If they have been 
engaged in any fraud to us and we find out about it, that 
would essentially be automatic grounds for removal from 
the community. 
 
In addition to that, I think we alluded to this a little bit 
earlier, we’ve got these broad principles that all 
companies sign onto when they become a Certified B 
Corporation, which is our Declaration of 
Interdependence. It’s the general vision statement that we 
offer. And the second caveat for potential action from our 
Standards Advisory Council would be essentially an 
irremediable violation of the spirit of that Declaration of 
Interdependence. 
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I would be the first to say I think that our Declaration of 
Interdependence doesn’t provide the specifics to 
determine if this company did X in this circumstance, and 
therefore that’s beyond the pale. But that is the general 
framework, which our Standards Advisory Council 
utilizes to make that judgment. It is something that I think 
we’ve been in the process of developing with a little bit 
more rigor—how to perhaps apply that in the future. 
 
Bart: So complaints show up. A complaint has to be material, 
specific, and credible for us to launch an investigation. 
And then that complaint falls into a materiality matrix. 
The materiality matrix looks at three things: the scope of 
the problem, the intensity of the problem, and whether it’s 
a repetitive problem. And so imagine another Rubik’s 
cube that has those three variables on it where we’re 
scoring the issue on low, medium, or high to determine 
(A) whether it needs to go to the Standards Advisory 
Council, and then (B) if it goes to the Standards Advisory 
Council, the Standards Advisory Council has remedies. 
 
The first remedy is just disclosure. This isn’t something 
that needs to be remediated or is disqualifying, but it 
absolutely is something of note for the industry and to our 
stakeholders. Second is remediation and third is removal. 
And we have applied all three remedies historically. 
 
Larry: So it’s not the case that upon ascertaining the existence of 
a material problem you wipe the slate clean and do a zero-
based reevaluation and somebody who qualified initially 
with 82 points is now down to 76, and therefore gets 
decertified? 
 
Bart: In the case that has an 82 down to 76 because they 
materially misrepresented themselves on the assessment, 
we’re not having any further conversations. If there’s a 
material misrepresentation—intentional 
misrepresentation . . . . 
 
Larry:  Absent that, though. 
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Bart: Yeah, absent that, what certainly happens is they go back 
and do an evaluation process. And in some cases, people 
actually drop out of the community because they’ve fallen 
below the bar. If they want to come back into the 
community after they’ve remediated, it begins with 
another onsite. We have a required onsite at that juncture. 
In fact, in some cases, we also track things over time. 
 
The Declaration of Interdependence sounds a lot like a 
morality clause that I used in all my contracts with NBA 
players when I was back at AND1. Hopefully, this is not 
dissimilar to the things that you all are familiar with. It 
just creates the opportunity for reputational protection. 
 
Dan: Before we take anything to the Standards Advisory 
Council, we conduct what is essentially a 90-day 
investigation for any of the issues that trigger that matrix 
and therefore would require the review. And so in those 
90 days, we are gathering as much information as we 
possibly can about the issue with the company, as well as 
the broader issues and concerns around whatever is the 
issue in question. And so there’s been some conversations 
around Etsy—it went through this process, which has 
been disclosed. So we were engaging with tax experts, 
etc. to better understand the relevant issues. 
 
Larry: A couple of more quick questions about standards and 
then we can move onto our third topic. This came up a 
little bit yesterday. One of my points was about negative 
points. Is there anything further you want to say about 
why that’s not part of the practice or how it’s treated? 
 
Bart: Hopefully people understand our position on it, which is 
that there is a philosophy which acknowledges that it’s a 
real issue and the way that we lean into it is through 
disclosure. We believe that the way to balance all of this 
is to provide full transparency. One of the things that we 
haven’t talked a lot about over the last few days is that we 
talked about core standards of performance through the 
assessment. We’ve talked about higher standards of 
accountability through the legal framework. 
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The third element of all Certified B Corporations is 
transparency. So once you take the assessment, you need 
to be transparent with the actual results. And pushing that 
even farther, Larry, if you’ve actually indicated on your 
disclosure questionnaire that you’re a wine producer, that 
obviously needs to be disclosed. That is one of the IFC 
exclusionary practices. If you’ve had material litigation in 
the last five years, that needs to be disclosed. 
 
So we lean heavily into transparency around negative 
practices to try to provide to stakeholders the opportunity 
to make their own decisions on balance. As we’ve 
indicated, in certain circumstances the background check 
or DQ issue might be so significant that it has triggered a 
review by the Standards Advisory Council and we’ve 
denied certification. But more often than not, it ends up in 
remediation and/or disclosure. 
 
Larry: I want to give you a chance to close out this scaling point. 
Little company, big company. Big company has a huge—
potentially—more positive impact on the world than the 
little company. Does that get factored in and how? 
 
Dan: I think that the first clarification that we made on that 
earlier, which is depending on what exact product you’re 
thinking about, in terms of what we are offering, that scale 
is incorporated. So for instance, for GIIRS ratings on that 
analyst side for sophisticated investors, etc., who are 
interested in diving in, they are able to access that scale 
information. Importantly, that is separate from the score. 
So you’re able to look at the two of them together and 
draw your conclusions. 
 
We have deliberately chosen not to incorporate that scale 
piece into the scoring itself. I’ll give a quick example. The 
worker section of our assessment at a high level is 
essentially asking the question: how well are you treating 
your workers? If we were incorporating scale into that 
score of how well you’re treating your workers, then the 
large company that is scoring relatively poor and not 
treating their workers very well, would have a higher 
2017] A Conversation with B Lab 349 
score than the small company that is treating their workers 
great. 
 
We’ve also been discussing how we’ve incorporated this 
in our GIIRS ratings and that analytics product, and it 
probably does make sense for us to think about how we 
can incorporate that into the public profile of B Corp 
certification. So I think that’s something that we’ll 
explore in the future. 
 
Larry: The last question about standards—a reliability 
question—depends to some extent on the quality of your 
investigation, the information you’re getting. Have you 
considered doing more? 
 
Bart:  Sure, yeah. 
 
Larry:  Like a cost–benefit analysis? 
 
Bart: Yeah. Let’s acknowledge where we’re at, which is 
certainly that our preference would be doing an audit of 
every Certified B Corporation on the globe. I’m sure that 
would be great to have—we’d have about seven B Corps 
and they all would have paid 200 grand to certify. So 
there’s a balance that you need to create between 
verification where you have confidence in the results and 
simultaneously cost where you don’t price yourself out of 
the market. And as it is, I’ll acknowledge as I did last 
night: Certification is a terrible business. It is a terrible 
business. 
 
In the foreseeable future, I don’t think B Lab will break 
even on its certification business. If we made this a fully 
loaded cost for certification, the cost of creating the tech 
platform, standards, and verification process would be 
seven digits for larger companies. And it’s just not 
pragmatic. So we’ve tried to find that combination of a 
survey review with our team, documentation, and onsites. 
 
We’re trying to verify 50 to 70 percent of the points that 
you earned from documentation. So that can be 25 to 30 
questions. It depends upon how well you score. But we do 
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documentation and an assessment review, and we do the 
onsites. And the onsite is essentially the old red velvet 
hammer, right? There’s a one in five shot in every 
certification period where somebody’s going to show up 
and verify what you did. And moving to GIIRS, when we 
launched GIIRS, we launched it with Deloitte as our 
partner to do the verification work for GIIRS. 
 
What did we hear back from the market? “I’m not paying 
for that. I’m not ready to pay for validated GIIRS ratings. 
Just reporting today is enough.” So what I fully anticipate 
in benefit reports, in GIIRS ratings, and even in B Corp 
certification, is there’s going to be a marketplace that 
develops around verification. Where people will 
determine—for example, Prudential, UBS, or the 120 
investors we work with—that they want all their GIIRS 
ratings validated in future years. 
 
We will have created a marketplace for Ernst & Young, 
Price Waterhouse, Deloitte, and the rest who have all been 
validated to actually do the incremental verification. But 
that’s going to be market driven, as much as anything. 
And so we’ve actually priced different levels of 
verification—we offer that currently. The only thing we 
insist upon is our bare minimum for certification and a 
GIIRS rating. 
 
Rick: And there are companies that get assurance from 
accounting firms on their CSR reports. 
 
Bart:  Right. 
 
Rick: So it’s a business that’s out there. It’s not right for our 
standards, but for others’ standards. 
 
Dan: I also want to add, our verification process, as is for B 
Corp certification, is not at an audit level. It’s intended to 
get the right score—not to identify fraud. On that note, it’s 
actually doing a really, really good job of it. The way that 
we structured it—where there is a random selection 
process, both at the documentation level and the onsite 
level, and with the data we’ve seen around what that 
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actually means for scoring—we can say that at the end of 
that process, that company has gotten to this score, within 
a relatively tiny margin of error. So I’d like to highlight 
that for a moment. 
 
Bart: And we also acknowledge that if somebody intentionally 
walks in the door with a focus on committing fraud, it will 
be very hard to determine if, for example, they 
manufacture the documents because an audit requires 
third-party validation. We do not do third-party 
validation. 
 
Larry:  It’ll work for a while? 
 
Bart:  For a while. 
 
Dan: We have, incidentally, caught fraudulent documents 
before through our public complaint mechanism. That 
does a lot of work for us by allowing our public to be a 
watchdog for us. So we have complaints from employees 
internally who are concerned about what their company is 
doing and how we can address that. 
 
Larry: Rick—How about we change gears and talk about our 
third subject, which is the legal side of all this? Two 
related questions, just to review, what is the legal 
requirement for certification and why? 
 
Rick: I actually think we haven’t really talked about what the 
legal requirement is. Basically, as Bart sort of expressed, 
long before I had anything to do with B Lab, the founders 
had this concept that part of what wasn’t working in 
allowing businesses to be a force for good was this notion 
of stockholder primacy. So the requirement is basically 
that if you’re going to certify, then you need to adopt what 
we call mission aligned governance, if you can. We don’t 
require anybody to change where they’re incorporated, 
and we don’t require anybody to change the form of entity 
that they have. 
 
So, for example, if you’re an LLC in just about every 
jurisdiction in the US, you are able to change. Through an 
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amendment to your operating agreement, you can adopt 
mission aligned governance because there’s a provision 
in the LLC act that says you can change fiduciary duties—
you can just put that in. And if you go on our website, you 
can see the language that we ask you to put in your 
operating agreement to make sure that the manager has 
duties to all stakeholders. And then if you’re a corporation 
in a state that has benefit corporations, we would ask you 
to become a benefit corporation. 
 
But if you’re a corporation and in a jurisdiction where you 
could simply amend your charter and that would get you 
to have stakeholder obligations, then you can do that. A 
good example of that is the UK because the Companies 
Act Section 172 says your duty is to your members, which 
means your stockholders, and then you look at all the 
stakeholders—we talked about that earlier today, but its 
subsidiary to the stockholders. However, Section 172 
goes on to say that you can change the objects and you 
can broaden that. So we have language that we ask UK 
companies to put into their charter. 
 
And what’s interesting about Carol Liao’s presentation 
today is we’ve come to understand that Canadian 
jurisdictions are sort of like the UK where you could get 
to stakeholder obligation, but only if you amend your 
charter. So we’ve asked companies to do that. We’re 
going to take a hard look at Carol’s work to see if we’re 
prying too much in Canadian corporations. 
 
We’re agnostic as to form, as long as the form gets you to 
have obligations to all your stakeholders, not a select set 
of stakeholders. 
 
Larry: So I take it you got some pushback from this. Do some 
companies say we are perfectly capable of doing good 
without going into this legal form and that hasn’t worked? 
 
Rick:  That hasn’t worked to change our view. 
 
Larry:  Right. 
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Rick: That is correct. That’s correct that we’ve gotten pushback 
and that is correct that we’re not planning to change it. 
 
Larry:  Is that even an obstacle? 
 
Rick: I think for some companies. So here’s how it works. If 
you can get the 80 points, you get to sign the term sheet. 
You can be certified and we give you a two-year grace 
period. You have to recertify every two years so by the 
time you get to your recertification, you need to adopt 
mission aligned governance. We have an exception where 
we give you a longer period of time—if it’s four years 
from the date your jurisdiction allowed you to adopt that 
because it takes time for everybody to work it out. 
 
So, for example, January 1, 2016, was the four-year 
deadline for California because it was four years since its 
benefit corporation statute became effective. We had a 
whole bunch of companies that had certified and that were 
coming up at the deadline so we had to work with all these 
companies to get them across the finish line. And out of, 
I don’t know how many, I think we lost two companies. I 
think it was six that didn’t make it by the deadline. We 
gave four extensions and we had two that we lost. The 
deadline for Delaware is August 2017, so that will be 
another date where we’ll be working with companies to 
make sure that they’ve been able to convert to benefit 
corporations. 
 
Larry:  Did you have 50-some of these? 
 
Bart: More than that, yeah. And one thing I do want to add is 
again, coming back to the perfect is the enemy of the 
good, there are some jurisdictions that we determine you 
cannot consider stakeholders—that it would not be upheld 
in a court of law. An example is Australia where we’ve 
actually had a brain trust of maybe two dozen attorneys 
working on this for over 18 months now. Their 
determination is that rewriting a charter actually would 
not be upheld in a court of law, and as a result, we need 
legislation—we have a community of 100 B Corps in 
Australia. 
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And what they essentially signed is an agreement that says 
when we determine the legal pathway in your jurisdiction 
for stakeholder consideration, you will have two years to 
adopt it or you will lose your certification. So coming 
back to let’s build a community, that community of 100 
Certified B Corporations are now working with that brain 
trust. Bill Clark has been over there twice to actually pass 
the legislation over the course of the next year. 
 
Rick: And that was the case in Italy, as well. They have now 
adopted legislation. 
 
Bart:  Same problem. 
 
Larry: Inability to determine that without it, you could commit 
to . . . . 
 
Bart:  Correct. 
 
Larry: So I have a couple of related questions dealing with this 
incipient growth of public benefit corporations—call it 
public. Is the legal requirement an obstacle in particular 
to the growth of public companies? I had in mind concern 
about litigation risk in public companies. Is that going to 
be a deterrent to adopting this form? At least we all 
understood these uncertainties. 
 
Rick: I think Brett’s and Jim’s presentation clearly presents 
some issues that this would raise for a public company 
that it wouldn’t raise for a privately owned company. I 
boil it down—and maybe it’s more complicated than 
this—to the fact that there is a professional plaintiff’s bar 
with respect to public companies, and I’ll try to be neutral 
as to whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing. I think a 
lot of people would say the reason that we don’t have to 
regulate the relationship between directors and 
stockholders is because we have these private attorneys 
general who do the job. 
 
And it’s been great, but it’s very painful for those of us 
who do a lot of management representation over our 
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careers and those that sit on the bench and deal with some 
of those complaints. But I think a lot of people would 
argue that, for whatever its imperfections, having a 
professional plaintiffs bar is actually one of the best ways 
to do that regulation. The concern is that you’re going to 
have that same plaintiffs bar being the regulator, 
essentially, and bringing cases. So the concern among 
public companies would be whether that litigation is 
going to make it difficult for us to do business. 
 
And again—we talked about this today and yesterday 
already—we worked hard on the statute to make it pretty 
difficult to bring (we hope) lousy claims. You have to 
have a pretty strong claim, we would think. You can’t 
have 100 shares—Delaware is actually a pretty low 
threshold because for a public company, you only have to 
have $2 million worth of stock. And so if you can get 
people who have some skin in the game and they think 
they have a claim that can get past the rationality test and 
business judgment rule, then you could bring that claim. 
 
So I think there is a discussion that you don’t have to have 
with private companies. Ultimately, I hope that will not 
be the obstacle. We have beginning proof of concept in 
that we have lawyers for KKR (KKR directors are going 
to be on that board), who were comfortable going forward 
with an IPO. We’ve had discussions with other public 
companies that are very interested in making the move. 
Also, there are companies in the pipeline that we hope will 
eventually go forward with an IPO. 
 
Just sort of thinking largely about it, there’s a lot of 
discussion today about the uncertainty with respect to 
some of these litigation outcomes. I say there’s absolutely 
uncertainty, but the reason there’s uncertainty is because 
you’ve moved the frontier. The idea is you are opening up 
more options for the board so there’s a broader space for 
the board to do things they are comfortable doing and they 
know they won’t get sued. The reason there’s uncertainty 
is because you don’t know exactly where those margins 
are and figuring out where those margins are would 
require litigation. 
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Bart: And just really quickly, so we say it out loud, although 
there is no benefit corporation in the US that’s gone public 
and only Laureate has filed their S1, there’s a couple of 
things we have taken as a decent indicator that we’re on 
the right path. First, although Etsy has yet to convert, their 
IPO story was largely that they were a Certified B 
Corporation. The press around that offering was that this 
is a Certified B Corporation and it’s going public. As Brett 
noted, despite their difficulty thereafter around a drop in 
stock price, importantly it was written in the S1 as a risk. 
I’m going to just pause for a second. That means that this 
was potentially a risk of loss of value if Etsy lose their 
certification, rather than a risk of the opposite. We were 
heartened by that. When the stock went out it doubled in 
the first day and maintained that price for some time 
before they hit their own bumps in the roads with their 
own financials. 
 
Secondly, are people familiar with Natura Cosmetics in 
Brazil, a $4 billion public company traded on the Sao 
Paulo exchange? Our language for Brazil looks very 
similar to the Delaware statute. Natura became a Certified 
B Corporation. In the same week of the Etsy IPO, Natura 
actually held the shareholders’ vote to rewrite their 
charter to include the benefit corporation language. That 
was approved by 100 percent of their institutional 
investors. Those institutional investors look really 
familiar to this room, right? They look really familiar to 
this room. 
 
Third and finally, two other things changed for us in the 
last year, as I said, within a week. Guilherme Leal, who is 
one of the cofounders in Natura, finally got in Paul 
Polman’s ear. For those of you who don’t know Paul, he’s 
the head of Unilever. Jostein Solheim, the CEO of Ben & 
Jerry’s, had been working with Paul for a while and said, 
“Hey listen, I think this is an important development.” 
 
And Paul, to his credit, has been a leader in the 
sustainability movement for a long time. At Davos, right 
after Natura joined, Paul went public and said, “Our North 
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Star is to be a Certified B Corporation. But they’re not 
ready for us yet.” And he’s right, but he said that’s where 
we want to head. And then he reiterated his aspiration to 
certify with President Bill Clinton at Clinton Global 
Initiative. That all happened within a two-week span. 
 
I can honestly tell you that we now get three calls a week 
from multinationals who want to be part of this 
community. Now not all of them will fit. Frankly, the vast 
majority probably won’t. However, I do think there’s a 
sense from the broader community that this is the cute, 
little $2 million social enterprise that’s building wells in 
Tanzania. We have some of those. They’re important 
companies. 
 
Larry:  Not that there’s anything wrong with that. 
 
Bart: There’s nothing wrong with that, but that’s not our 
aspiration. After Unilever’s announcement, Danone has 
actually joined forces with us. They’re in the process of 
putting ten of their corporations through the assessment, 
potentially joining us as Certified B Corporations and 
their aspiration, too, is to have global headquarters 
eventually certified. Again, I have no idea if they’re going 
to qualify, but it’s heartening to us that we’re actually 
beginning to have the conversations with the mainstream. 
How do we move this to the mainstream? It’s slowly, but 
surely. 
 
Rick: And talking about public companies and other ways that 
they’re getting in, as you know, Campbell Soup acquired 
Plum Organics and they are maintaining Plum Organics 
as a benefit corporation and a Certified B Corporation. 
United Therapeutics is a biotech company and they also 
converted—they’re not a member of the Certified B 
community, but they converted their operating subsidiary 
Lung Bioscience into a benefit corporation. 
 
There are a lot of public companies who are looking at 
some very interesting things, including forming benefit 
corporations and using them to raise money. They want to 
have a piece of the business that is very socially oriented 
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and that’s the way they want it structured. So there’s 
actually a lot of interest from different directions in the 
public market to get involved with benefit corporations. 
 
Larry: So what got us here, at least to begin with, is concern 
about litigation as a potential deterrent to public company 
participation. There are two others yet to be identified if 
you think about going public. You mentioned one, Rick, 
it’s proxy advisors—another rating organization. And 
then there’s activist stockholders. So what’s your thought 
about whether those players are going to be a problem? 
 
Rick: We’ve talked to the major proxy advisory firms and 
others, and ISS actually recommended in favor of a vote 
for Natura to opt in. We also spend a lot of time talking to 
institutional investors and the view always seems to be we 
can’t tell you benefit corporations are good in a vacuum, 
but if what you’re telling us is this is a good business and 
this is a tool that they think they’re going to use to create 
value for us, we’re onboard. 
 
And ISS is largely in that same boat. And also—this is 
true both for ISS and for a lot of the management and 
governance people at the institutions—they, separate 
from just thinking about value, have sustainability 
functions. They do think broadly at the institutions, 
somewhat like universal investors. I say at ISS, they don’t 
jump at the chance to say that because that’s not how they 
advise people. They very much advise company by 
company votes. 
 
But of course, they are often proponents of stockholder 
proposals and social proposals, and they have a pretty pro-
sustainability tilt. There is less an issue there than you 
might think. And I sort of went into those discussions with 
great trepidation, but came out of them feeling pretty 
good. 
 
Now, to move to the activists, where the trepidation is 
perhaps more real. Because what I think you have there—
and this is to state the obvious, but to sort of just spell it 
out—is concern that let’s say you take the firm 
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commitment at face value and you say we think we’re 
going to get more value by committing up front to do 
certain things, and maybe that will get everybody to buy 
in. But then you get to a point in your life where you have 
to follow through with that commitment, so there would 
be the temptation. In theory, temptation to defect. 
 
And the board is, in good faith, not going to defect. Well, 
what if the activists say, “Arbitrage play, right? We’ll get 
rid of that board that’s acting in good faith and we’ll put 
in some people who defect”? That, to me, is a real risk and 
there is a menu of ways to address the risk. You can 
address it structurally by saying the way we’re going to 
enforce our benefit corporation purpose is that when we 
go public as the benefit corporation, we’re going to have 
a staggered board, we’re going to have an A/B stock 
structure, or we’re going to have tenured voting—sort of 
naming your defense so that we will make it hard for 
activists to come in with that arbitrage play because it will 
preserve value. 
 
I think it will be up to the market because you can go to 
your stockholders and you can make that sales pitch. 
When you’re doing your IPO, you can say we’re a benefit 
corporation and this is how we’re going to protect it. And 
they might say, “We don’t like that. We’d rather you were 
a benefit corporation and don’t worry, we’ll deal with the 
activists.” And you hope that could work—Unilever is a 
really good example. If you look at the studies of their 
stockholder profile, their stockholder profile became 
much better when Paul Polman came in and started 
talking about long termism. 
 
I think I said at the very beginning yesterday that this 
doesn’t work unless you bring the institutions that own 70 
percent of the market. The activists, they’re a relatively 
small portion, but they’re influential. And you’re going to 
have to bring the institutions along, and they’re going to 
have to understand that this won’t work if you just sort of 
flip for the arbitrage play every time it comes along. 
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Larry: Okay. In about five minutes, it’s time for our audience to 
ask questions. Let’s get back and talk about where are we 
and how we have done. Are you where you expected to 
be ten years ago? 
 
Bart:  No. 
 
Larry:  Further along? Further away? 
 
Bart: We’re both ahead and behind. We’re certainly farther 
ahead in terms of legislative issues, both domestically and 
globally. We’re farther behind what we expected in terms 
of Certified B Corporations. At this juncture, we thought 
we’d have tens of thousands of Certified B Corporations. 
And Larry, you asked earlier about the barrier to 
certification. It’s not the standards, but the legal 
requirement, without question, for private companies 
(anybody with outside investors). This is a process. You 
have to educate the investor, you have to talk to the board, 
and it requires a board vote. They need to understand 
what’s happening—it’s a process. And so without 
question, we are not as far along as we anticipated in the 
number of Certified B Corporations. 
 
Backing all the way up, let’s take a moment and just talk 
about the theory of change and we can put some numbers 
to it. You guys decide whether we’ve made progress or 
not. 
 
The objective of B Lab is to redefine success in business. 
That means institutionalizing certain things that include 
standards and a legal change. It also means normative 
behavior change. At the core, to make any of this work, 
there needs to be a change in the culture around business. 
Our approach is to shine a light on the leaders and then 
create easy paths for others to follow. The leadership 
community is now 1,800 big, including 51 countries and 
150 industries, and growing more rapidly outside of North 
America than inside of North America. This year we will 
have more B Corps outside of the US than inside the US. 
 
2017] A Conversation with B Lab 361 
We introduced our global work probably five years ago 
and it is accelerating nicely. So that’s the community of 
leaders. I will tell you in North America, we have largely 
shifted from quantity to quality. We still want as many 
Certified B Corporations as possible, but in terms of our 
efforts, we far prefer getting another Eileen Fisher and 
Kickstarter, both who joined in the last six months, than 
the next 15 beautiful startups or small companies. So 
quality matters—it actually moves the needle for us much 
more rapidly. 
 
The two pathways to scale is adoption of the legal 
framework and our measure what matters initiative. So 
we can only track, Larry, the people who have (and 
frankly poorly) actually become benefit corporations. It’s 
really hard, as has been indicated by everyone here. It’s 
hard to know what that number actually is. We estimate 
somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 if you include the 
LLCs, somewhere in that range. And, as somebody else 
appropriately noted, there’s a ton of misfires in there. 
 
There’s also a ton that we’re not capturing because they’re 
not tracked by the secretaries of state. Because they get 
this passed in the state and they say, “Guys, I can’t deal 
with more bureaucracy. Do not put me on the hook of 
trying to track all this.” And so admittedly, we don’t have 
a real good database of how many of those are benefit 
corporations. But even with the numbers we have, I think 
we feel okay with the fact that we’re four years into the 
legislation and we now have almost tripled the number of 
benefit corporations than we have Certified B 
Corporations in terms of a leadership play. 
 
If we back up, the second scaling tool is the use of the 
impact assessment tool or our measure what matters 
initiative. So maybe five years ago, we had about 600 B 
Corps and we had 6,000 users of the assessment. We had 
a 10 to 1 leverage ratio. And it was at that juncture that 
we decided that we were going to create a strategy that 
was about trying to drive adoption of the assessment and 
increase that leverage ratio. So today we have 1,800 
Certified B Corporations and are closing in on 50,000 on 
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the assessment. So we’re around a 30 to 1 ratio and our 
hope is to take that to a 100 to 1 ratio over the course of 
the next few years. 
 
And the way we do that is we work with intermediaries. 
We work with investors, government, supply chain 
decision makers, and business associations. For 
examples, we have a program with the City of New York 
called Best for NYC. They asked us to work with them to 
encourage all companies to be like a B Corp in the City of 
New York, so we created a competition called Best for 
NYC. To qualify, you use the assessment. 
 
So in our first three-month pilot, we had about 2,000 
users. We had 200 finalists and 100 honorees. The City—
this is their estimate, not mine—estimated that we’ll have 
60,000 companies on the assessment in the next five 
years. We now have 30 cities that have also expressed 
interest. It’s launching in Rio, Sydney, Denver, and 
potentially Portland or Philadelphia this year. Those are 
pilots to try to figure out how to do this well. 
 
We have about 20 to 30 companies that use it for supply 
chain. Most recently, Bancolombia down in Medellín 
developed a partnership with us where they’re running 
150 companies through this year. They want to expand 
that to 12,000 companies within three years and that’s 
their supply chain. 
 
Also, I don’t know if you all know the B team? Richard 
Branson and Jochen Zeitz have a bunch of others who are 
talking about Plan B for capitalism. We just went into a 
partnership with them around “Born B”—the idea of 
creating insight and a program for companies to adopt this 
early, whether it’s the corporate form or using the 
assessment. Those are just examples of distribution 
channels. When we lift our heads and say we’ve got 1,800 
Certified B Corporations, we recognize we have an 
awfully long way to go. 
 
That being said, we are heartened by a beginning of a 
change in the conversation, whether it be Paul Polman or 
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Danone. Forbes came out this year with their five business 
trends to master 2016, one of which was be like a B Corp. 
Fast Company came out with 20 things that mattered most 
over the last 20 years—it included the iPhone, streaming 
music, Uber and Airbnb, and the creation of B Corp was 
there. Slightly hyperbolic, at a minimum. But the point is, 
as I said to Chuck yesterday morning, look who’s in the 
room. You all came to talk about this. So I know we’ve 
got a long way to go, but I’d like to say, the conversation 
is starting to change. It’s starting to change and ultimately 
the long-term objective is a fundamental change around 
the culture of business. 
 
Larry: You may have noticed this is not a group that’s shy about 
asking questions. So that’s a good place to stop and see 
what people have to say—yeah, Chuck. 
Chuck  
O’Kelley: I tried to get someone to do an article on the question I’m 
going to ask you. What can you share with us about how 
B Lab itself is organized and governed? 
 
Bart: I’m going to try and make it quick because I’m sure there 
are a lot of questions. Standards depend on governance, 
and we try to create a layered governance structure where 
we have an independent board of directors that oversees 
B Lab with only one member of management on it—that’s 
myself—and six other members. We then have two more 
layers of governance that we fit into our structure, one of 
which is that independent Standards Advisory Council 
that is not a fiduciary body—we’re not trying to create 
liability for those folks who sit on that Standards Advisory 
Council. 
 
So the way that it works is they make recommendations 
to the B Lab board of directors who carry the fiduciary 
responsibility. But those recommendations require a 
supermajority vote of the board of directors to overturn. 
So the idea is to empower that Standards Advisory 
Council. 
 
Then underneath the Standards Advisory Council are 
working groups. We had one working group that created 
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the higher education addendum and one around health and 
safety. We also had one working group around the 
financial services industry. Those groups report to the 
Standards Advisory Council—same structure where they 
make recommendations that require two-thirds super 
majority vote of the Standards Advisory Council to 
overturn any of the work of the working group for them 
to feel empowered. 
 
Lastly, we have a Global Governance Council that 
oversees the global expansion of the movement. We work 
with independent nonprofits in each of the markets. 
There’s B Lab Europe, B Lab Australia, B Lab UK, 
Sistema B down in Latin America—all of those are 
independent nonprofits. They all have representation on 
the GGC. We have the GGC that oversees the acceptance 
and the removal of any partner in the global community. 
 
They also oversee all earned income strategies around 
conflicts of interest, all grants around conflicts of interest, 
and all policy. Because at the end of the day, we can’t 
have rogue policy coming out of any member of the 
community because it influences the entire, broader 




Liao: Thank you so much, that was really interesting. I know 
that we’re seeing more of B Lab and the global reach that 
you have. On your website, you talk about how you are 
now in 51 countries. My question is, are you concerned 
about the Americanization of your standards and the sort 
of ethnocentrism that may occur? You talk about being an 
education platform for these certifications all over the 
world and telling them that this is the policy and the 
process you have to follow. This is a concern that 
obviously came up in Canada, as you saw from my 
presentation. 
 
I’m curious, is this something that you think about when 
applying your standards to other institutions in other 
countries? Your work in Canada has evidenced how your 
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organization is susceptible to ignoring a nation’s existing 
laws and cultural context. So my first question is, are you 
worried about the Americanization of the standards or 
not? And second, if so, what do you think you’ll do to 
solve that? 
 
Bart: Hugely concerned. Hugely concerned about the 
Americanization—the single greatest criticism of B Lab 
globally and the movement globally is that it’s an 
American export, full stop. We’re doing what we can to 
combat it. Let me talk it through. Every member of that 
global community nominates somebody to the Standards 
Advisory Council. So the Standards Advisory Council 
actually has representatives from every global partner, 
including Canada and all the other markets. Each region 
has their own standards council that is governed and 
managed by the global partner that makes 
recommendations to the Standards Advisory Council 
about what’s most appropriate for that particular market. 
 
One of the great tensions we have is maintenance of the 
standards and globalization of the standards. So currently, 
we have essentially three different versions based upon 
regions: US, global, and emerging market. Ideally, what 
we’d be able to do over time is add local nuances to . . . . 
 
Carol:  Where’s Canada in that? 
 
Bart:  Global. 
 
Carol: Okay, I just wanted to make sure. I didn’t know if it was 
just folded into U.S. Okay. 
 
Bart: We can talk later about that. But no, it would be global. 
And so we have all of that feedback that comes into the 
Standards Advisory Council and it’s translated into four 
languages—we used to have more, but we dropped 
Mandarin, Russian, and Vietnamese because it was too 
much to maintain—not enough of a community and, for 
example, no B Lab Vietnam there to actually drive it. So 
ultimately, this needs to reflect local realities. The 
standards need to reflect local realities. 
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And then second, Carol, I’ll tell you the same thing 
applies for the legal standard. B Lab doesn’t choose the 
requirement in each particular market about what charter 
change and/or benefit corporation legislation would be 
most appropriate. That’s determined by a local group of 
attorneys, who have formed local legal groups to 
determine what the appropriate ways are to incorporate 
stakeholder consideration within the global context. 
They’re in Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Brazil, Canada, 
Australia, France, and the UK—so yes. 
 
Carol: In Canada, I know some of the legal counsel you have 
used are offering pro bono time. It’s not necessarily that 
they’re supporting B Lab’s initiatives. They’re just 
answering the legal questions for you and that may not 
necessarily provide the cultural context to whether or not 
they think it’s appropriate or necessary, but whether or not 
it’s possible to advance. 
 
Bart: It’s global. We certainly have rah-rah and we have folks 
who are answering questions. 
 
Carol: My question is also about those few B Corps that are 
coming out in other countries. For example, you have one 
African B Corp. Where do they come from and what is 
the motivation behind them? Is it an American parent 
company with an African sub company, or is it an 
American customer telling their supplier to become a B 
Corp? Are they approaching you? I’d like to know the 
motivation behind these companies. 
 
Bart: Almost exclusively the latter, meaning that almost all 
those one-offs come to us. And often it results in the 
creation of a community. So we currently have ten B 
Corps in Taiwan, nine in Korea, and we don’t have a B 
Lab office in either of those markets. There was 
somebody who heard about the movement, an 
entrepreneur, and said, “This is who I am. I want to join 
this community.” And then they created a ton of local 
energy. 
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I would imagine by the end of the year, we will have a B 
Lab Taiwan because the first B Corp in Taiwan ended up 
organizing an event in March and have recruited eight 
other B Corps in the community. Their event was 
keynoted by the President of Taiwan, sponsored by the 
Taiwanese Stock Exchange and the Small Business 
Administration in Taiwan, and it had 500 participants. 
One of the great tensions that B Lab has that we haven’t 
talked about is building a movement and simultaneously 
making sure that the integrity of the movement isn’t lost. 
What gives me the most anxiety is that it is incredibly 
challenging to make sure that the core identity of what it 
means to be a B Corp and the community that we’re 
building both has the latitude to thrive and simultaneously 





Reiser: So I’m incredibly impressed by the distance that B Lab 
has covered since its inception. I was at Berle One; I was 
the last person to present to a room that was not nearly as 
sympathetic as this room to the idea. And I told them 
about this idea and the reaction from many of the 
attendees was, essentially, that I must be a crackpot. And 
now the whole symposium is about the benefit 
corporation and you’ve gotten a tremendous amount of 
traction in state legislatures and even a global reach. 
 
I sometimes say skeptical things about the benefit 
corporation in particular, but I’m very impressed with the 
organization that you’ve grown and the impact it’s had. It 
seems to me—drawing on the comments from Rick 
Alexander and Bart Houlahan—that the benefit 
corporation statute and the legal change strategy is about 
getting the law out of the way. There are people out there 
that want to pursue blended value and whatever the 
outcome of the Strine-Stout debate may be, the law is seen 
as an obstruction and we’re going to get that out of the 
way. 
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I’m not sure how big of a problem the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm is or for whom, but I agree that if it’s 
a problem for potential social entrepreneurs, we want to 
get it out of the way—I’m on board with that. 
 
But Steven Dean and I believe there is a further frontier 
from the legal perspective once you have the law out of 
the way. That’s not where the legal challenges end. Rick’s 
comments reflected this notion when he spoke about the 
public company context. He is concerned that once you 
have a benefit corporation going public, you need to 
consider how a standard board will act and some way to 
prevent arbitrageurs from seeking control in order to shift 
away from social mission. 
 
Even outside of the public context, though, anytime you 
bring in capital, you need to get your investors on the 
same page with the folks who are running the company 
and you need to have that trust developed. Bart’s 
experience with outside investors certainly speaks to this 
need. 
 
Our view is that, fortunately, there are many legal tools to 
develop that trust.1 We don’t think any legal form can 
actually do that on its own—and it sounds like you agree 
with us. Is B Lab interested in working on developing 
other legal tools that would help further that kind of 
second generation of social enterprise law to help 
entrepreneurs and investors align on mission to increase 
capital access? 
 
Rick: We wouldn’t discourage people from doing that, but I 
think it’s important for us to be sort of agnostic with what 
structures people put in. In other words, I think it’s 
perfectly appropriate for somebody to say, “Look, you 
don’t have to be the most—the stuff’s all there on the 
shelf.” There’s tons of ways to help companies have more 
time with respect to stockholder decisions. But I think 
there are many ways. I think you have to let people try—
if people think they can do it, essentially begin as dual 
                                                     
 1. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST, PUBLIC 
BENEFIT AND CAPITAL MARKETS (forthcoming 2017). 
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class, it’s only dual class until the investors sell out and 
they are converted down. 
 
So they’re comfortable going that route. Now, maybe 
that’ll turn out to be a big mistake and people will say, “If 
we’re going to go public as a benefit corporation and 
we’re going to get the benefit, we really do need these 
structures.” But I do think we have to be careful not to 
say, “We live in 2016 when stockholder activism is 
greater than it’s ever been and that’s how the world 
always is.” There was a long period of time when 
companies had the ability to sort of take their time and 
think long term, and they didn’t have to have staggered 
boards in order to do that. 
 
And then things changed and you have the current 
markets. So I just don’t want to get stuck in the moment. 
I just don’t want to get stuck in you need dual class, you 
need a staggered board, you need this. I think we’re going 
to have to let people try different things. 
 
Dana: I don’t want to monopolize the conversation, but there are 
a lot of things outside of corporate governance that you 
could do to get mission alignment. You could structure 
your financing in a way to do that. You could do exit 
planning to do that. My work with Steve focuses on these 
further moves, but B Lab could be a leader in these 
innovations, as well. 
 
Rick: I don’t know if you’re thinking in the public or the private, 
but clearly in the private . . . . 
 
Dana:  In the private context, particularly. 
 
Rick: Clearly, in the private context to me there are a lot of 
things you can and should do in order to preserve mission 
if that’s what you want to do. But I think in public context, 
your tools are more limited. 
 
Bart: The only thing I’d add to that, Dana, is that we do end up 
being a repository of best practices, which we are happy 
and excited to do. And whether it’s being a distributor of 
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the SASB impact metrics or carrying Hitachi’s best 
practice guidelines, one of the things we have access to is 
a lot of companies. We’re trying to educate them—we 
welcome being a library where people can actually ask us. 
And over time, there are also ways that things actually 
work their way into the assessment. 
 
Haskell  
Murray: I’m with Dana. Dana has written a good bit more than I 
have in the social enterprise law area,2 but I wrote one of 
my very first articles about benefit corporations and was 
told by a number of people that I was wasting my time 
studying these entities because the benefit corporations 
were going to be a short-lived fad.3 There’s still 
skepticism and there is still progress to be made with 
benefit corporation law, but I think it’s encouraging to see 
that we’ve come far enough to have an entire, serious, 
two-day academic conference on the form. Scholars are 
certainly taking benefit corporations more seriously now, 
even if there continues to be valid concerns in some areas 
of the law. B Lab’s openness to constructive criticism and 
willingness to evolve has impressed me, and its continued 
openness is going to be important in the future of social 
enterprise. 
 
That said, I have a rather narrow question. I believe Yvon 
Chouinard, Patagonia’s founder, was on record saying 
that one of the reasons Patagonia became a benefit 
corporation was to “lock-in” the firm’s mission. He’s very 
passionate about the social mission of Patagonia, 
especially the environmental piece, and he appears to 
want to lock it in for a long time. I agree with Dana that 
the benefit corporation does not provide a very secure 
lock for the social mission. It may be a hurdle to get two-
thirds of your shareholders to agree to make the switch 
out of the benefit corporation form, but if there is a lot of 
                                                     
 2. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 619 (2010); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations-A Sustainable Form of Organiza-
tion?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011); Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social 
Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681 (2013); Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231 (2014). 
 3. J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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money to be made, that vote may be easier to get. 
However, then the social mission of the firm may be 
compromised. 
 
And so I am thinking about ways to lock in the social 
mission of a benefit corporation. Do you think Delaware 
would be open to something like a dead-hand poison pill 
in the public benefit corporation context, even though 
Delaware is obviously not open to defenses like that in the 
traditional C-corporation context? 
 
Rick: In Anne Tucker’s work on constituency statutes, she 
looks at the cases. I think if you look at the Nevada cases, 
you might say you can’t take other constituency-type 
ideas too far—the stockholder franchise is still the 
stockholder franchise. So I would not be confident that 
you could get to a dead hand pill under that law. But I 
want to say, I’m not sure it’s a snap to have the board get 
rid of the benefit corporation provisions with a two-thirds 
stockholder vote. Because when they make that decision, 
when they are voting as directors, they have their benefit 
corporation director obligations. They need to make a 
case as to why it’s in the best interest of their balanced 
constituencies to convert out. 
 
Haskell: The board can be removed. 
 
Rick: The board can be removed, but then another board is 
going to have to . . . . 
 
Haskell: They still have that. 
 
Rick: I understand what a wild case that’s going to be. But it’s 
there and it’s something that’s similar—again, as 
someone said earlier, it’s not the enforcement so much as 
the reinforcement here. 
 
Frank  
Partnoy: What should we take back and teach our students? Should 
we be focused on the various statutes? Should we focus 
on cases or on hypotheticals? Should we have a discussion 
about the various policy issues and if so, which issues? 
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How much information should we include about the 
development of these new entities? We have limited 
bandwidth in our courses, so what should be our priorities 
in teaching? We’ve got a bunch of professors here, so 
please give us some guidance as to what we should take 
home and teach. 
 
Rick: To me, it’s all these questions that I’ve heard and these 
marginal questions. How is enhanced business judgment 
going to work when you’ve got more constituents? What 
about this switching back and forth? When you switch 
into the benefit corporation law, do you have to put your 
stockholder primacy hat on as a director and say, “Despite 
the two-thirds vote, or despite the 99 percent vote that I’m 
going to get, do I have to worry about that one percent 
stockholder who wants to stay stockholder primacy?” 
 
So there’s that question going back and forth. There’s 
great questions about appraisal value. There’s an article 
that started that conversation that Larry and I coauthored,4 
but there’s a lot of valuations and . . . . 
 
Larry: Let me also say you other law professors do something I 
know on ultra vires and corporate purpose. When I’ve 
done it, which has been a couple of years now, I didn’t 
talk about B Corps, but I would now. I think it must be 
part of the curriculum if you’re going to talk meaningfully 
about corporate purpose. Corporate purpose has become 
too big of a deal—we have statutes to look at. There’s a 
lot more curriculum on that subject now than there was 
three years ago. So I’m not telling you what to say, but it 
seems to me that’s where I would go with it. 
 
Bart: Not surprisingly, I want to be far more simplistic: teach 
anything on this. Backing all the way up, when you think 
about our long-term objective, we focus on barbells. We 
focus on influencers over here, and then we focus on 
startups over here. And in the middle, we let it show up. 
That’s our strategy. People can take issue with it, but 
that’s our strategy. On the left hand side means being 
                                                     
 4. Frederick H. Alexander et al., M&A Under Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A 
Hypothetical Tour, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 255 (2014). 
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embedded in law schools, in business schools, and 
undergraduate institutions. We work with 500 universities 
currently who teach something about this movement. 
 
And so I think most of the room is law professors and 
there are some business school professors. We have a 
whole area on our website that includes the beginning 
pieces for materials around what’s a B Corp.5 What’s the 
difference between a benefit corporation and a Certified 
B Corporation? There are wonderful topics on our 
website. We need folks to leave school with the 
knowledge that they have another choice. We hope it 
would be coupled with the growing evidence that the 
choice isn’t exclusively for a social enterprise, but it’s 
also for the organization that’s trying to create long-term 
value. I think there is a body of work that is relatively 
compelling regarding the idea that environmental and 
social governance issues absolutely return good value to 
your shareholders over the long haul. 
 
Rick: I think the important piece there is that you can’t teach the 
fiduciary duty question at the corporate level in isolation. 
You must look up the investment chain—I think the 
Cambridge Handbook on Institutional Investment and 
Fiduciary Duty6 is a great work with lots of really good 
articles, including one by Keith Johnson,7 who is a great 
proponent of this idea that investment fiduciaries aren’t 
really doing their job if all they’re focusing on is company 
by company, static thinking and not being sensitive to the 
choices made within their portfolio on their entire 
portfolio. That’s got to be a piece of the puzzle. 
                                                     
 5. B Corporation, Resources for Educators, https://www.bcorporation.net/educators 
[https://perma.cc/XZ6Y-Y76Y]. 
 6. CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY (James P. 
Hawley et al. eds., 2014). 
 7. Keith L. Johnson & Stephen Viederman, The Philanthropic Fiduciary: Challenges for Non-
profits, Foundations and Endowments, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 
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